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At the harbor of Mytilene on the Greek island of Lesbos in the summer of 2014, I was 
struck by an emblematic scene: a party of tourists debarked from a cruise ship and, 
heading toward the custom house, walked past a group of immigrants just apprehended 
at sea. The tourists did not seem to notice the immigrants, despite the fact that their 
visibility was accentuated by the surgical masks they had been provided—most likely to 
protect autochthones from some imagined contagion. 
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The situation seemed a flawless representation of the different speeds of today’s world: 
a compelling portrait of the contemporary power lane, built upon mobility and its 
control. Through a daisy-chained set of devices, mobility is progressively being 
constructed as a means of social differentiation and discrimination, a new configuration 
of power on a global scale. The divide between “frequent flyers” and “boat people” is 
an enactment of such differentiation, and the daily toll of deaths at the gates of Europe 
is one of its most dramatic results. 
The news today, as I write, is frightening: thirty-eight people missing after the sinking 
of a wooden boat; at least eleven—mostly children—deceased in other incidents around 
the Aegean. The most obscene paradox is that they lost their lives trying to reach a place 
where, in all probability, they would have been entitled to asylum. It is the same virtual 
right they shared with the 370 people who died off the Italian island of Lampedusa on 
October 3, 2013; the 268 Syrian citizens drowned just eight days later; the 800 people 
deceased between September 10–13, 2014; the 224 people whose boat capsized in 
Libyan waters just one day after; or the 800 passengers who perished in a shipwreck on 
April 19, 2015. The list is endless. After the shock, responses always go in the same 
direction: criminalizing migration and invoking new and more efficient means of 
control. This contradiction between humanitarian imaginaries and (deadly) migration 
policies takes on paradoxical features, such as when, after the events of October 3, 
Italian authorities granted the dead honorary citizenship while charging the survivors 
with illegal entry. 
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This double bind recurred in May 2015, when the European Commission released its 
new European Agenda on Migration, a plan aimed at taking “a swift and determined 
action in response to the human tragedy in the whole of the Mediterranean.” The 
document proposed to redistribute people among E.U. member states and to increase 
resettlements from outside Europe, a point that sparked controversies about how many 
people each state should accept. Despite such humanitarian prescriptions, most of the 
program is directed at strengthening surveillance and engineering a more efficient 
machinery of detection and removal. 
Most initiatives are justified as fighting trafficking and smugglers—a narrative that 
disguises border control as an ultimate humanitarian priority. Concurrently, border 
spectacle (De Genova 2013) contributes to conveying, through images of human excess, 
the ideas of invasion, predation, and contamination. As a result, a powerful account 
about scarceness becomes dominant, in which the notion of crisis stands out as a key 
figure. 
Even if we accept that the current influx of people is truly unprecedented—although we 
should not forget that 672,000 people from the former Yugoslavia applied for asylum in 
other European countries in 1992—these narratives enable the denial of any residual 
awareness that, on a continent of 742 million people, human excess is itself a 
construction. If we trust data provided by the International Organization for Migration, 
757,192 persons arrived in the European Union between January and early November 
2015. It is unquestionably a significant figure, yet one that corresponds to only 0.15 
percent of the estimated five hundred million inhabitants of the Union and a fraction of 
the refugees hosted in countries like Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iran. 
In the richest region of the planet, the idea of scarcity needs to be seriously questioned. 
Though shortage in social provisions may be real, scarcity’s driving force is surely the 
polarization of riches that has occurred in the last two decades. The great transformation 
induced by neoliberal policies has led to the collapse of welfare systems, the 
degradation of working conditions, and the privatization of common resources, leaving 
European societies less resilient and more agonistic. This is the true nature of the 
ongoing European crisis: a structural readjustment carried out to produce a massive, and 
sometimes even exceptional, transfer of resources toward the upper crust of the 
society—an authentic class struggle from above (Gallino 2012). 
It is by no means coincidental that this process has accompanied the fabrication of the 
European border as a mechanism of social differentiation and subaltern inclusion. The 
European Commission has stated in various documents that migration should be better 
“managed” so as to make the most of its productive potential. The recruitment schemes 
elaborated within the so-called circular migration programs—tailored toward seasonal 
migrants—are a paramount example of this idea of labor without citizenship, as well as 
an uncanny recurrence of imperial formations (see Stoler 2012) that legitimated the 
management of “humans as things” (Roque 2014). In this light, are traffickers’ practices 
really so different? 
As a young Pakistani asylum seeker told me some months ago, “If you want something 
better, you go elsewhere; why can’t we?” Like many people in the world, he was 
looking elsewhere for safety, money, and a possibility to dream. For many people like 
him, moving at any cost is a form of reparation, a claim for justice in a world of 
growing imbalances. 
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